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INTRODUCTION
It is now 15 years since the negotiations on climate
change formally commenced in 1990.1 Two years of
negotiations led to the adoption of a comprehensive
multilateral framework agreement on climate change
– the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) – in 1992.2 Two years later,
the convention entered into force and paved the way
for negotiations to begin on a follow-up protocol.
Three years after that, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was
adopted, which includes targets for industrialized
countries and a number of ﬂexible mechanisms for the
implementation of these commitments.3 Eight years
later, in February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered
into force. All of these developments point to a rather
successful legal regime that has moved incrementally
forward and – compared to other complex multi-
lateral environmental agreements – has done so rather
quickly.
Yet, the withdrawal of the USA from the Kyoto Proto-
col in 2001 has cast a damper on the progress made
within the regime and has affected its momentum.4
This has spawned a series of articles in the literature
whose authors can broadly be classiﬁed into two cate-
gories: those who believe that the best way to address
a problem as complex and serious as climate change
is to widen (include other related issue areas and
institutions)5 and broaden and deepen6 (develop new
policies, mechanisms and follow-up protocols) the
climate change regime; and those who believe that
climate change is so complex that it would be impos-
sible to have a uniﬁed global agenda and that one must
instead seek solace in the so-called orchestra of efforts
where a number of different regional, national, local
and/or sectoral agreements are negotiated by like-
minded countries, possibly independent of each other.7
The most signiﬁcant difference between these two
categories is that the ﬁrst approach focuses on the
1 For an overview of  the negotiations on the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, see D. Bodansky, ‘The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commen-
tary’, 18:2 YJIL (1993), 451.
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New
York, 9 May 1992).
3 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Kyoto, 11 December 1997).
4 In 2001, President Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol as being
‘fatally flawed in fundamental ways’. The USA has, instead, chosen
a ‘bottom-up’ approach, focusing on incentives for new technologies
and voluntary (business) participation. See A.C. Christiansen, ‘Con-
vergence or Divergence? Status and Prospects for US Climate
Strategy’, 3:4 Climate Policy (2003), 343.
5 See, for example, W.B. Chambers (ed.), Global Climate Govern-
ance: Inter-Linkages Between the Kyoto Protocol and Other Multi-
lateral Regimes (United Nations University Institute of  Advanced
Studies and Global Environment Information Centre, 1998). On link-
ages between the climate and non-climate regimes, see F. Yamin
and J. Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A
Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge University
Press, 2004), at 509–543. See also J. Gupta, The Climate Change
Convention and Developing Countries – From Conflict to Consensus?
(Kluwer, 1997), at 198–200.
6 Broadening and deepening commonly refers to broadening
participation (by developing countries) and deepening commitments
(of  developed countries). See, for example, A. Michaelowa et al.,
‘Graduation and Deepening: An Ambitious Post-2012 Climate Policy
Scenario’, 5:1 International Environmental Agreements: Politics,
Law and Economics (2005), 25.
7 See, in particular, T. Sugiyama and J. Sinton, ‘Orchestra of  Treaties:
A Future Climate Regime Scenario with Multiple Treaties among
Like-Minded Countries’, 5:1 International Environmental Agree-
ments: Politics, Law and Economics (2005), 65. In addition, some
writers suggest that countries such as the USA should negotiate
such a regional agreement with like-minded countries that also have
an interest in using market-based approaches, for example certain
Latin American countries. See D. Bodansky, ‘US Climate Policy
After Kyoto: Elements for Success’, Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, Policy Brief  No 15 (April 2002). Likewise, it has been
suggested that the USA should initially stay outside the Kyoto frame-
work and should seek to establish a new framework with China
and, possibly, other key developing countries. See R.B. Stewart and
J.B. Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy (AEI Press, 2003). A
renewed focus on private and public–private initiatives has also
been suggested. See R.A. Rinkema, ‘Environmental Agreements,
Non-State Actors and the Kyoto Protocol: A “Third Way” for Inter-
national Climate Action?’, 24:3 University of  Pennsylvania Journal of
International Economic Law (2003), 729. Many of  these proposals
are reviewed in F. Biermann, ‘Between the United States and the
South: Strategic Choices for European Climate Policy’, 5 Climate
Policy (forthcoming).
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climate regime (UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and possible
follow-up legal instruments), whereas the latter is
characterized by more ad hoc agreements between
countries at a regional or sectoral level, or even agree-
ments between public and private parties, all not neces-
sarily under the auspices of a single climate regime.
The starting point of this article is that these two paths
are not incompatible and that there is, thus, no need
to dichotomize between them. Instead, one can re-
concile both approaches by arguing that they may be
mutually supportive and that policy options can be
explored both within a multilateral framework and
outside of it. In fact, almost none of the mentioned
proposals on a future climate regime suggest rejecting
the multilateral framework completely. On the con-
trary, most proposals suggest either a role for the
UNFCCC as a facilitator for other approaches8 or
envisage a return to this framework in due time.9 This
indicates that the second approach does not neces-
sarily exclude multilateralism.
This article identiﬁes a range of policy and legal
instruments and measures to help the global effort to
address the climate change problem, and speciﬁes
whether such measures can be adopted as a direct
follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol or whether such meas-
ures will require other parties to engage in the debate
and adopt regional, sectoral or public/private agree-
ments. The focus is less on broadening and deepening
the climate change agenda, which has been explored
elsewhere in the literature,10 but rather on how one
can widen the climate change agenda through new
and innovative policy and legal measures, in particular
through the utilization of interlinkages of existing
material, and the strengthening and promotion of new
institutional interlinkages.
The article proceeds as follows. First, the nature of
climate change as a political problem will be sketched
out and issue linkages (broad, overarching relationships
between different issue areas, such as between biodiver-
sity and climate) that are used in the analysis will be con-
ceptualized and deﬁned. Key material and institutional
linkages will be examined with a set of other policies,
namely poverty alleviation, land use, energy, trade
and investment, air pollution, health, maritime and
air transport, human settlements, freshwater, and seas
and oceans. The article is then concluded by summing
up strategic design options for widening the development
of the regime.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The complexity of resolving the climate change prob-
lem can be partly ascribed to the fact that climate
change is interlinked in both cause and effect with
most areas of human activity. Mitigation of, and adap-
tation to, climate change requires measures in many
sectors that range from energy and transport to land
use and urban development. All of these are inher-
ently linked with the development goals of countries.
In short, effective climate policy is tantamount to
effective sustainable development policy.
Sustainable development, however, is too complex an
issue to be addressed within one institutional arrange-
ment.11 In the past decades, therefore, a large number
of separate, yet frequently overlapping, treaties and
other legal instruments related to sustainable develop-
ment and environmental protection have been agreed
at the international level.12 Most of these have been
negotiated in a single-issue area in order to keep the
issues manageable and politically feasible, and to
make use of windows of opportunity within the exist-
ing global power and interest conﬁgurations that
allow countries to cooperate on individual issues.13 As
a result, many agreements in the international arena
regulate activities of countries on a number of small-
issue areas.14 This is not just an empirical observation,
8 See, for example, T. Sugiyama and J. Sinton, ibid., at 71–74.
9 See, for example, R.B. Stewart and J.B. Wiener, n. 7 above, at 132.
10 Broadening is, for example, explored in J. Gupta, ‘Leadership in
the Climate Regime: Inspiring the Commitment of  Developing
Countries in the Post-Kyoto Phase’, 7:2 RECIEL (1998), 178; and
J. Gupta, ‘Engaging Developing Countries in Climate Change (KISS
and Make-Up!)’, in D. Michel (ed.), Climate Policy for the Twenty-
First Century: Meeting the Long-Term Challenge of  Global Warming
(Centre for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2003),
233. Broadening and deepening proposals have been summed up
in D. Bodansky et al., International Climate Efforts Beyond 2012:
A Survey of  Approaches (Pew Center for Global Climate Change,
2004), and many proposals have been assessed by N. Höhne,
What is Next After the Kyoto Protocol? Assessment of  Options for
International Climate Policy Post-2012, Ph.D. Thesis (Utrecht Uni-
versity, 2005).
11 One reason behind this is the specific nature of  the international
system, which is often described in political theory as inherently
anarchic. However, as much research within the framework of
neo-institutionalism has indicated, cooperation among States is
possible, for example through the creation of  international regimes
as networks of  principles, norms, rules and decision-making proce-
dures. See, for example, G. Junne, ‘Beyond Regime Theory’, 27:1
Acta Politica (1992), 9.
12 On the Ecolex website (available at <http://www.ecolex.org>),
operated jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World
Conservation Union (IUCN), an up-to-date database of environmental
treaties can be found. P. Sands, Principles of  International Environ-
mental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 127, referring to a
1989 UNEP database, mentions that there were 139 treaties registered
at that time. This does not include treaties indirectly related to the
environment and the many (over 2000) bilateral treaties.
13 O.R. Young, Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environ-
mental Experience. A Conference Report (Dartmouth College, 1995), at 4.
14 See, generally, G. Junne, n. 11 above, and E.B. Haas, ‘Why collabor-
ate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes’, 32 World Politics
(1980), 357.
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but also a recommendation by several political scien-
tists.15 Successful regime formation often depends
upon the problem being simple, benign and limited.
At the same time, however, linking issues can create
new windows of opportunity to synchronize separate
regimes and to win support from more countries in a
gradual effort to make progress in sustainable develop-
ment.16 Such linkages may compensate reluctant
countries by serving as side payments and, thus, help
promote favourable outcomes in other ﬁelds.17 This
idea received an additional impetus from the process
of rationalizing and reorganizing the work undertaken
within the UN since 1992 to focus on increasing the
efﬁciency of the UN system and remove internal con-
tradictions.18 Also, links between issues can help to
raise climate change on the agendas of governments
and to exploit potential co-beneﬁts and no-regrets
options.19 For example, if the climate problem is
framed in terms of water or energy policy, then
governments may also take actions in those areas that
they otherwise may not have been motivated to do if
the issue had been framed only as an abstract and
long-term threat.20
The analysis below will focus on material and institu-
tional interlinkages. Material (or functional or factual)
linkages are inherent structural connections between
policy domains that are largely independent of the
rules and procedures of political institutions in the
domain. Examples are the effects of deforestation on
global warming, or vice versa, and the negative impacts
of global warming on agriculture in many regions.
Institutional and organizational linkages are con-
nections between societal institutions, for example
between the norm-setting process of the climate regime
and the norm-setting process of the biodiversity
regime, as well as linkages between different organiza-
tions, for example between different international
organizations active on environmental issues. Addi-
tional possible linkages between issues not discussed
in this article include political (or bargaining) linkages
that result from the strategies of countries or negotia-
tion facilitators who are able to link issues in order to
generate larger bargains,21 and normative interlink-
ages that result from situations when one regime
conﬁrms or contradicts the norms upheld by another
institution and, thus, affects its normative compliance
pull or the normative force of international law.22
With material linkages, it is possible to study the
potential for enhancing collaboration between two
issue areas because of their interconnectedness. With
institutional linkages, it is possible to study different
institutions, treaties and organizations with a view
to examining whether they are compatible, synergetic,
incompatible or contradictory. Studying these links
helps to identify ways in which the combined impacts
of institutions and organizations can be enhanced.23
MATERIAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES
This section reviews material and institutional
interlinkages of the climate regime with a number of
other issue areas. In each subsection, the material and
institutional interlinkages are sketched out, and then
proposals for potential additional institutional inter-
linkages that could be promoted and agreed upon by
governments are outlined.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND POVERTY
Since the climate regime includes both rich and poor
countries, any attempt to engage developing countries
15 M. Hisschemöller and J. Gupta, ‘Problem-Solving through Inter-
national Environmental Agreements: The Issue of  Regime Effective-
ness’, 20:2 International Political Science Review (1999), 153.
16 See n. 5 above.
17 F.W. Mayer, ‘Managing Domestic Differences in International
Negotiations: The Strategic Use of  Internal Side Payments’, 46:4
International Organization (1992), at 793.
18 In 1992, the need for an integrated approach within the UN
became clear at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development in Rio de Janeiro. This led to the establishment of
five working groups within the UN to examine the issue of  reform.
Since then various processes have been set in motion to create
more efficiency within the system. See, in general, the website
available at <http://www.un.org/reform/>. See, on the specific issue
of  managing environmental issues, for example, the contributions in
F. Biermann and S. Bauer, A World Environment Organization: Solu-
tion or Threat for Effective International Environmental Govern-
ance? (Aldershot, 2005).
19 See J. Gupta and M. Hisschemöller, ‘Issue Linkages: A Global
Strategy Towards Sustainable Development’, 9:4 International
Environmental Affairs (1997), at 289.
20 Such streamlining can ensure that synergistic results can be opti-
mized at least cost, and contradictory policy impacts are identified
and, to the extent possible, minimized.
21 See O. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environ-
ment in a Stateless Society (Cornell University Press, 1996). These
kinds of  linkages can be observed in actual negotiations, for example
in the negotiation of  the Rio conventions, or as a political oppor-
tunity, for example the linking of  Russian ratification of  the Kyoto
Protocol in late 2004 to significant concessions related to Russia’s
World Trade Organization (WTO) accession obtained from the EU.
22 One example is the conflict between world trade law and some
environmental standards, which are currently being addressed through
the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism. See O.S. Stokke, The
Interplay of  International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to
Work?, FNI Report 10/2001 (Fridtjof  Nansen Institute, 2001), at 10.
23 See, in more detail, H. van Asselt et al., ‘Interlinkages of  Global
Climate Governance’, in M.T.J. Kok and H. de Conink (eds), Beyond
Climate: Options for Broadening Climate Policy (Dutch National
Research Programme on Global Change (NRP-GC), National Insti-
tute for Public Health and the Environment (The Netherlands)
(RIVM), Bilthoven, NRP Report No 500036001, December 2004), at
223–224.
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will have to take some of their speciﬁc priorities into
account, including the need to reduce poverty.24 In
addition, there is also a material relationship with
poverty alleviation. On the one hand, climate change
will have disproportionate, adverse impacts on the
poor and is a cause of poverty – in particular the lack
of capacity to adapt to climate change impacts.25 On
the other hand, countries that have to deal with the
immediate pressing needs of poverty alleviation are
unlikely to prioritize an abstract and less immediate
problem such as climate change.26 Poverty alleviation
itself implies increased consumption and possibly
production and, hence, an increase in greenhouse gas
emissions. Furthermore, poverty can affect the ability
of a community to adapt to the impacts of climate
change.27 Poverty can be caused by micro-level factors,
such as those related to the individual and to house-
holds; by meso-level factors, such as those related to
communities, production sectors, product and market
factors; by macro-factors such as those related to
monetary policy, ﬁscal policy and governance issues;
and by international factors, such as those related
to trade policy, international debt and monetary
policy.28
An effective international climate change strategy
would, thus, try to ﬁnd ways to link up with the pov-
erty policies undertaken at the global level and main-
stream climate change concerns within them. This
would primarily have to be achieved through inﬂuenc-
ing foreign aid and development bank (such as the
World Bank) policies in such a way that, in addition
to reducing poverty, vulnerability to climatic change is
reduced. In addition, mainstreaming climate change
policy in national sectoral policies is essential in help-
ing developing countries to integrate adaptation into
their planning processes. Developing small-scale
renewable energy programmes in rural areas could
also address the need to both reduce poverty and
mitigate climate change. Such programmes are being
developed in South Africa and India. They should be
affordable and sustainable, as well as integrated into
rural development programmes.29
CLIMATE CHANGE, LAND USE AND 
BIODIVERSITY
Another critical issue linkage is the link between clim-
ate change and land use. The way that land is used,
in particular for agriculture and forestry, has implica-
tions for greenhouse gas emissions, and climate
impacts themselves may affect land use in the future.
For example, wet rice cultivation emits methane, while
certain soil types and forests absorb greenhouse gases
in the stages in which they grow and, hence, form
carbon sinks or reservoirs. However, ecosystems that
are prone to desertiﬁcation may lose this function
and may contribute to climate change.30 Wetlands (in
particular peatlands) also form reservoirs for carbon,
but are very sensitive to changes in the climate and
related changes, including sea-level rise.31
Furthermore, land use is an important factor for the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and
climate change may affect biodiversity directly if eco-
systems or species are not able to adapt to climate
impacts.32 Finally, in many countries, large sections
of the population are employed in land-use sectors;
therefore, an effective climate change strategy needs
to link up with international regimes focusing on these
sectors. At the international level, there are conven-
tions dealing with biodiversity (the 1992 Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD)),33 desertiﬁcation (the
1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertiﬁcation
(UNCCD))34 and wetlands (the 1971 Ramsar Conven-
tion)35. There is no comprehensive global forest
treaty,36 but there is presently a mechanism for global
24 See UNFCCC, n. 2 above, which acknowledges this in Article 4(7).
25 See, for example, International Panel of  Climate Change, Sum-
mary for Policy Makers, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation,
and Vulnerability (Cambridge University Press, 2001), at 8.
26 See J. Gupta, n. 5 above. See also J. Gupta. and M. Hiss-
chemöller, n. 19 above.
27 See M. Munasinghe, Analysing the Nexus of  Sustainable Develop-
ment and Climate Change: An Overview (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2003), at 14.
28 See G. Pyatt, ‘Poverty Versus the Poor’, in G. Pyatt and M. Ward
(eds), Identifying the Poor (IOS Press, 1999), 53.
29 See J. Gupta et al., An Asian Dilemma: Modernizing the Electric-
ity Sector in China and India in the Context of  Rapid Economic
Growth and the Concern for Climate Change (IVM Report E-04/01,
Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
June 2001).
30 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)
Secretariat, Review of  Activities for the Promotion and Strengthen-
ing of  Relationships with Other Relevant Conventions and Relevant
International Organizations, Institutions and Agencies: Note by the
UNCCD Secretariat (ICCD/COP(3)/9, 28 September 1999).
31 See G. Bergkamp and B. Orlando, Exploring Collaboration
between the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran 1971) and the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (IUCN, 1999), at 6
and 9. See also F. Parish and C.C. Looi, Wetlands, Biodiversity and
Climate Change. Options and Needs for Enhanced Linkage
between the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, Convention on
Biological Diversity and UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Background Paper for the International Conference on
Synergies and Coordination between Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (Tokyo, 14–16 July 1999).
32 J.A. Kim, Institutional Interplay Between Biodiversity and Climate
Change: Toward Synergy Creation (United Nations University
(UNU)/Institite of  Advanced Studies (IAS) Working Paper No 100,
February 2003), at 1.
33 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992).
34 Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experi-
encing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa
(Paris, 17 June 1994).
35 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of  International Importance
especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar, 2 February 1971).
36 See D. Humphreys, ‘The Elusive Quest for a Global Forests Con-
vention’, 14:1 RECIEL (2005), 1.
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forest policy in the form of the UN Forum on Forests
(UNFF),37 and the CBD remains important in this
ﬁeld. Additionally, the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) has a number of initiatives that link food
security and agricultural issues to climate change.38
The objectives of the regimes on climate change,
desertiﬁcation, forests, biodiversity and wetlands are
synergetic.39 However, the cost-effectiveness principle
of the climate regime could imply that the ecological
dimensions of climate policies are not respected
fully.40 This is most apparent with regard to the rules
on sinks. For example, although the Kyoto Protocol
calls for the promotion of sustainable forest manage-
ment,41 activities enhancing sinks can both be synergetic
or conﬂicting with the goal of forest conservation.
Conﬂicts may occur if governments seek to achieve
their climate goals through cost-effective afforestation
or re-forestation projects that involve creating fast-
growing monoculture forest plantations that reduce
biodiversity.42 On the other hand, there is potential
for synergies, if sustainable forest management is
promoted.43 In a similar vein, if the use of land for
carbon sequestration leads to the conversion of wet-
lands, this will contradict the objectives of the Ramsar
Convention.44
Efforts that explicitly address the interactions between
climate change and land use and biodiversity are
underway. In 2001, the Collaborative Partnership on
Forests was established to promote cooperation
and coordination on forestry issues (including on the
importance of forests for climate change), with the
UNFCCC, CBD and UNCCD included in the partner-
ship.45 Furthermore, convention secretariats have
observer status in each other’s regimes, and the secre-
tariats of the Rio conventions (UNFCCC, CBD and
UNCCD) have set up a joint liaison group (JLG) to
promote cooperation, exchange information on plans
and enhance cohesion at the international, as well as
the national level.46 The FAO is already an observer in
the climate negotiations. Additionally, steps have been
undertaken to address interlinkages between the Rio
conventions and the UNFF with regard to forest land-
scape restoration at the national level.47 In order to
enhance synergies and reduce conﬂicts between the
various regimes, there are a number of key policy
options, including developing a memorandum of
understanding (MoU) between the Ramsar and the
37 See the United Nations Forum on Forests website for more informa-
tion, available at <http://www.un.org/esa/forests>. At the fifth meeting
of the UNFF in May 2005, attempts by European countries to abandon
the UNFF and to obtain agreement on an international arrangement
on forests failed. See ‘Fifth Session of  the United Nations Forum on
Forests – Summary and Analysis’, 13:133 Earth Negotiations Bulletin
(30 May 2005), at 14, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/
enb13133e.pdf>.
38 By 1988 the Food and Agriculture Organization had established
an Interdepartmental Working Group on Climate in Relation to Agricul-
ture and Food Security. In addition, the FAO Forestry Department
created a task force on forestry and carbon sequestration to coordi-
nate forestry and climate activities. The FAO also hosts the Global
Terrestrial Observing System, under which the Terrestrial Carbon
Observation Initiative was developed to monitor carbon sources and
sinks in agricultural and rural sectors. See, for an overview of  the
climate change related activities of  the FAO, the FAO’s website on
climate change, available at <http://www.fao.org/clim/activities.htm#2>.
39 See, for example, the Preamble to the UNCCD, n. 34 above,
which acknowledges this potential for synergy. Also, the UNFCCC,
n. 2 above, calls on parties to ‘cooperate in the conservation and
enhancement . . . of  . . . biomass, forests and oceans as well as
other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems’ (Article 4(1)(d)),
and to develop and elaborate ‘appropriate and integrated
plans . . . for the protection and rehabilitation of  areas, particularly
in Africa, affected by drought and desertification’ (Article 4(1)(e)).
40 The UNFCCC, ibid., Article 3(3), dealing with the precautionary
principle, states that ‘lack of  full scientific certainty should not be
used as a reason for postponing . . . measures, taking into account
that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be
cost effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible
cost’ (emphasis added). This requirement thus limits States in tak-
ing certain precautionary measures. See F. Yamin and J. Depledge,
n. 5 above, at 71. D. Bodansky, n. 1 above, at 503, notes however
that this formulation is already less stringent than that of  Principle
15 of  the Rio Declaration, which requires the measures themselves
to be cost effective, rather than taking this into account.
41 See Kyoto Protocol, n. 3 above, Article 2(1)(a)(ii).
42 F. Jacquemont and A. Caparrós, ‘The Convention on Biological
Diversity and the Climate Change Convention 10 Years After Rio:
Towards a Synergy of  the Two Regimes?’, 11:2 RECIEL (2002), at
174.
43 There is no universal agreement as to what constitutes ‘sustain-
able forest management’. According to the FAO, sustainable forest
management ‘aims to ensure that the goods and services derived
from the forest meet present-day needs while at the same time
securing their continued availability and contribution to long-term
development’. See FAO, Promoting Sustainable Management of
Forests and Woodlands (FAO, undated), available at <http://
www.fao.org/forestry/site/18227/en>. Although important rules were
agreed upon with regard to forestry activities under the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM, see n. 60 below) at the Ninth Con-
ference of  the Parties (COP-9) to the UNFCCC in 2003, non-
governmental organizations still argue that these rules do not exclude
large-scale monoculture plantations and, hence, do not promote
sustainable forest management. See M. Meinshausen and B. Hare,
Sinks in the CDM: After the Climate, Biodiversity goes down the
Drain. An Analysis of  the CDM Sinks Agreement at COP-9 (Green-
peace, 2003).
44 See Ramsar Convention, n. 35 above, Article 3(1), which calls
upon parties ‘to promote the conservation of  the wetlands . . . and
as far as possible the wise use of  wetlands in their territory’.
45 For more information on the Collaborative Partnership on Forests
(CPF), see the CPF’s website, available at <http://www.fao.org/
forestry/site/2082/en>.
46 UNCCD Secretariat, Review of  Activities for the Promotion and
Strengthening of  Relationships with Other Relevant Conventions
and Relevant International Organizations, Institutions and Agencies:
Note by the UNCCD Secretariat (ICCD/CRIC(1)/9, 15 October
2002). The Ramsar Secretariat was also invited to participate in the
joint liaison group, but has only done so occasionally.
47 For an overview, see C. Saint-Laurent, ‘Optimizing Synergies on
Forest Landscape Restoration Between the Rio Conventions and
the UN Forum on Forests to Deliver Good Value for Implementers’,
14:1 RECIEL (2005), 39.
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UNFCCC Secretariats.48 Another option would be to
promote the use of renewable energy (such as solar
energy) in rural areas, through ﬁnancial incentives
within the climate regime and through other options
such as development aid from the multilateral develop-
ment banks, thereby reducing the pressure to cut
ﬁrewood. A third option includes promoting speciﬁc
measures within the climate regime, such as limiting
the generation of carbon credits from converted wet-
lands, and instead promoting the protection of such
wetlands and protecting fragile ecosystems by zoning
procedures, introducing the concept of integrated
multi-functional land use, and synchronizing the pro-
vision of land subsidies and other incentives to allow
for multi-functional land use. National workshops, in
which the implementation of the different treaties is
linked, could help to identify context-speciﬁc bottle-
necks and synergies.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY
Climate change is closely linked to energy. Most
energy is developed through the exploitation of fossil
fuels and, thus, leads directly or indirectly to the
emissions of greenhouse gases. This is also a political
strategic link, since energy is a top priority of most
governments, even if climate change is not.49 At the
international level, the institutional context is, in
the ﬁrst place, provided by the International Energy
Agency (IEA), which focuses on energy issues of
developed countries and which examines global
energy issues,50 and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which aims to ‘accelerate and enlarge
the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the world’.51 In addition, the 1994
Energy Charter Treaty, signed and ratiﬁed by mainly
European countries, aims to ‘promote long-term
cooperation in the energy ﬁeld’ by regulating energy
investment, trade and the transit of energy.52 Further-
more, developments in the UN Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD),53 the 2003 Inter-
national Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (IPHE),54
and the World Commission on Dams (WCD)55 have
implications for climate change. The various energy
regimes are very open-ended and ﬂexible, and are not
speciﬁcally aimed at promoting sustainable sources
of energy as such. Synergies between the climate and
energy regimes are mainly limited to questions of
energy efﬁciency and security of energy supply. Both
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol emphasize the
need to develop energy-efﬁcient technologies and new
sources of energy, as well as technological coopera-
tion,56 but otherwise remain quite general on energy
issues. Energy sources with low (or no) greenhouse
gas emissions are primarily promoted through the
IAEA, as well as the various agreements on hydrogen
research. However, nuclear energy has other serious
environmental and security impacts, and hydrogen is
not yet a tried and tested energy carrier.57
The potential synergy between climate and energy
policy could be exploited further through, perhaps, the
development of an international partnership on sustain-
able energy policy, which may include representatives
from countries engaging in international energy initi-
atives from the climate change regime, as well as fossil
fuel exporters. The purpose of such a partnership
would be to discuss energy issues in a comprehensive
manner so that dams, hydrogen, nuclear energy and
fossil fuels are discussed in one forum. Another option
is negotiating a protocol to the UNFCCC, promoting
the increased use of renewable energy, or a protocol
on research and development of energy technologies.
Finally, the development and promotion of sectoral
48 Similar memorandums of  understanding, promoting cooperation
in the form of, inter alia, information exchange, scientific research
and capacity building already exist between the Ramsar and the
UNCCD and CBD Secretariats. See UNCCD Secretariat, Memoran-
dum of  Cooperation Between the Bureau of  the Convention on
Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) and the Secretariat of  the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in
Africa (Dakar, 5 December 1998), available at <http://www.unccd.int/
cop/reports/africa/igo/2004/ramsar_convention-eng.pdf>; and Ramsar
Secretariat, Memorandum of  Cooperation Between the Bureau
of  the Convention on Wetlands of  International Importance especially
as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar, 1971) and the Secretariat of  the
Convention on Biological Diversity (Nairobi, 1992) (Geneva, 19 January
1996), available at <http://www.ramsar.org/cbd/key_cbd_mou.htm>.
49 See, for the link between climate change and energy, F. Sindico
and J. Gupta, ‘Moving the Climate Change Regime Further Through
a Hydrogen Protocol’, 13:2 RECIEL (2004), at 176–177.
50 For more information on the International Energy Agency, see the
website available at <http://www.iea.org>.
51 Statute of  the International Atomic Energy Agency (New York,
23 October 1956), Article II.
52 Energy Charter Treaty (Lisbon, 17 December 1994), Article 2.
53 The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development
tries to coordinate energy policies. ‘Energy for sustainable develop-
ment, industrial development, air pollution/atmosphere, climate
change’ will be a key issue for the CSD sessions in 2006 and 2007.
See CSD, Report on the Eleventh Session (Docs E/2003/9 and
E/CN.17/2003/6, 9 May 2003), at 11. On the work of  the CSD related
to energy policy, see T. Marauhn, ‘A Global Energy Strategy as a
Viable Means for Redressing Climate Change?’, 63:2 Heidelberg
Journal of  International Law (2003), 281.
54 For more information on the International Partnership for a Hydro-
gen Economy, see the IPHE’s website, available at <http://
www.iphe.net>. See also F. Sindico and J. Gupta, n. 49 above, who
also discuss a host of  other bilateral agreements on hydrogen
research.
55 The World Commission on Dams (WCD) is relevant with regard to
large hydropower as an energy source. In a 2000 report, it concluded
that large dams bring ‘an unacceptable and often unnecessary
price . . . especially in social and environmental terms’. See WCD,
Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making
(Earthscan, 2000), at 310.
56 See UNFCCC, n. 2 above, Article 4(1)(c); and Kyoto Protocol,
n. 3 above, Article 10(c).
57 See F. Sindico and J. Gupta, n. 49 above, at 178.
RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 ADVANCING THE CLIMATE AGENDA
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.
261
agreements between major energy-producing com-
panies and between major energy-consuming sectors
could result in reductions of greenhouse gas emissions
in a bottom-up manner.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE 
AND FINANCE
Climate change is also intricately linked to trade and
ﬁnance. Climate change is affected by international
trade as trade potentially increases economic activities,
which can lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions.
Conversely, taking measures to reduce the greenhouse
gas emissions in speciﬁc countries might adversely
affect their competitiveness and, hence, reduce their
willingness to participate in such measures.58 The
substantive link between climate and international
ﬁnance and investment is that investment regimes and
development banks have often invested in projects
that have high greenhouse gas emissions, leading to
potential conﬂicts.59 Many have also argued that the
climate regime is, in effect, an investment regime.60
The international institutional context consists prima-
rily of the World Trade Organization (WTO),61 a range
of regional and bilateral trade agreements,62 more
than 2000 bilateral and regional investment treaties,
multilateral development banks and the Global Environ-
ment Facility (GEF).
The objectives and principles of the trade and climate
regimes are prima facie compatible. The WTO Agree-
ment, for example, notes the objective of sustainable
development in its Preamble.63 In addition, both the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol speciﬁcally aim to
ensure compatibility with the trade regime.64 Further-
more, the World Bank and the GEF have incorporated
the objectives of the climate regime in their policies.
However, in the area of investment, some investment
agreements prohibit the kind of conditioning of
investments that the Kyoto mechanisms promote.65
A potential normative conﬂict with regard to the GEF
is the question of who has the ﬁnal say in project
funding and general decisions. In case of conﬂicts, the
GEF could ultimately be held accountable by the
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC.66
However, apart from some minor problems related
to GEF procedures, and the fact that the GEF has sys-
tematically postponed ﬁnancing major adaptation
projects, serious conﬂicts between the GEF and the
UNFCCC have not yet occurred.67
The linkages between climate, trade and ﬁnance are, to
some extent, already addressed in international fora.
For example, the UNFCCC Secretariat has observer
58 See also S. Charnovitz, ‘Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts
and Synergies’, in Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort
against Climate Change (Pew Center for Global Climate Change,
2003), at 141. This article does not aim to provide an overview of
the many interactions between the trade and climate regimes,
including the questions of  compatibility of  energy taxation and
border tax adjustments, climate subsidies and energy-efficiency
standards with WTO law. For this, see, generally, D. Brack et al.,
International Trade and Climate Change Policies (Earthscan, 2000);
W.B. Chambers (ed.), Inter-Linkages: The Kyoto Protocol and the
International Trade and Investment Regimes (United Nations Uni-
versity Press, 2001); M. Lodefalk et al., Climate and Trade Rules –
Harmony or Conflict? (Swedish National Board of  Trade, 2004); M.
Doelle, ‘Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Motivate State
Action on Climate Change through the World Trade Organization’,
13:1 RECIEL (2004), 85; F. Biermann and R. Brohm, ‘Implementing
the Kyoto Protocol without the United States: The Strategic Role of
Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border’, 4:3 Climate Policy (2005).
59 See, on the relation between the climate and investment regimes,
for example, J. Werksman et al., ‘Will International Investment Rules
Obstruct Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of  the Clean
Development Mechanism’, 3:1 International Environmental Agree-
ments: Politics, Law and Economics (2003), 59. On the impacts of
development banks on the environment see, for example, P. Sands,
n. 12 above, at 1026.
60 In particular, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is
intended to stimulate investment flows from developed to develop-
ing countries in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See
J. Werksman et al., ibid., at 59. The CDM, established by the Kyoto
Protocol, allows non-Annex I (developing country) parties to access
additional resources from Annex I (developed country) parties to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (certified emission reductions –
CERs) from proposed or existing projects. Annex I parties can use
the CERs accruing from these projects to achieve their targets
under the Kyoto Protocol. See on the CDM, for example, M. Netto
and K.U. Barani Schmidt, ‘CDM Project Cycle and the Role of  the
UNFCCC Secretariat’, in D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds), Legal
Aspects of  Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms (Oxford
University Press, 2005), 175; and F. Yamin and J. Depledge, n. 5
above, at 159–186.
61 See the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(Marrakesh, 15 April 1994). For more information on the WTO, see
the website available at <http://www.wto.org>.
62 Most notably, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(Washington, Ottawa, Mexico City, 17 December 1992) and the EU
internal market.
63 See the Agreement Establishing the WTO, n. 61 above, Pre-
amble. In general, see F. Biermann, ‘The Rising Tide of  Green Uni-
lateralism in World Trade Law: Options for Reconciling the Emerging
North–South Conflict’, 35:3 Journal of  World Trade (2001), 421.
64 See UNFCCC, n. 2 above, Article 3(5), which states that ‘[t]he
parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open inter-
national economic system that would lead to sustainable economic
growth and development in all parties . . . Measures taken to com-
bat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute
a means of  arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade’. See also Kyoto Protocol, n. 3
above, Article 2(3), which states that ‘[t]he parties included in
Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures . . . in such
a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the . . . effects on
international trade’.
65 See, in general, J. Werksman et al., n. 59 above.
66 See P. Sands, n. 12 above, at 1036.
67 See S. Oberthür, The International Regime on Climate Change
(Ecologic, 2001), at 16, who notes that there is room for improve-
ment with regard to the efficiency and responsiveness of  the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) procedures. In addition, developing
countries continue to voice criticisms regarding the GEF, which is
often perceived, despite its reform in 1994, as being not fully
responsive to southern needs and interests.
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status in the meetings of the WTO Committee on
Trade and Environment,68 and the World Bank and
GEF have observer status at the climate COPs. An
MoU, specifying the role and responsibilities of both
the UNFCCC COP and the GEF, was adopted at the
second UNFCCC COP (COP-2) in 1996.69 The MoU
states, inter alia, that the climate COP will ‘decide on
policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria
related to the convention for the ﬁnancial mechanism
which shall function under the guidance of and be
accountable to the COP’.70
Since the WTO does not speciﬁcally require that its
members need to take the climate change issue
into account, it might make sense to establish a joint
WTO/UNFCCC working group to ensure that potential
conﬂicts between the two regimes are addressed.71
However, given the fundamental conﬂict of ideology
and interests between the two regimes in that the
WTO promotes free trade, which should stimulate
cheap production processes, and the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol promote sustainable production pro-
cesses, the strong institutional framework, history and
pedigree of the WTO, the differences in some critical
parties to both agreements (notably that the USA
and Australia are members of the WTO but have not
ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol), and the different minis-
tries engaged in negotiating the two issues, an MoU
would perhaps be more appropriate.72 Additionally,
‘grand bargaining’ could be used to make signiﬁcant
trade-offs in the ﬁelds of trade and climate.
Potential conﬂicts with investment regimes that
aim to protect the interests of foreign investors can
be avoided by the development and adoption of
an international sustainable investment agreement.73
It may also be necessary to mainstream climate
change into investment policies. Since countries do
not normally control foreign investment, host coun-
tries could develop a number of guidelines for foreign
investors.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND AIR 
POLLUTION
Climate change is also closely linked with other environ-
mental issues, such as (local) air pollution and the
depletion of the ozone layer. First, many substances that
deplete the ozone layer and many of their substitutes
(notably hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs)) are greenhouse
gases. Hence, eliminating ozone-depleting substances
generally creates synergies with abating climate change;
but can also create conﬂicts with climate protection if
the wrong alternative substances or processes are sup-
ported.74 Second, other air pollutants and greenhouse
gases often have common sources, interact with each
other in the atmosphere and, separately or jointly,
cause a variety of environmental effects.75
The international institutional context regarding
protection of the ozone layer is mainly provided by
the 1985 Vienna Convention76 and its 1987 Montreal
Protocol.77 Several treaties have also been negotiated
of which the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution and its protocols aim, among
other things, to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions.78
Overall, reducing emissions of air pollutants would
most likely lead to a general reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions as well.79
There are no other formal cooperative forums between
the climate and air pollution regimes, although the
68 However, the observer status of  multilateral environmental agree-
ments (including the UNFCCC) in the Committee on Trade and
Environment has not led to any substantive results. See U.P.
Thomas, ‘Trade and the Environment: Stuck in a Political Impasse
at the WTO after the Doha and Cancun Ministerial Conferences’,
4:3 Global Environmental Politics (2004), at 17.
69 See Memorandum of  Understanding between the Conference of
the Parties and the Council of  the Global Environment Facility
(Decision 12/CP.2, 29 October 1996), FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1.
70 Ibid., para. 2.
71 As suggested by L. Assunção and Z.X. Zhang, Domestic Climate
Policies and the WTO, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development Discussion Paper No 164 (November 2002), at 21.
72 Such a memorandum of  understanding could address contentious
issues, including the legality, under the WTO, of  trade measures
taken by parties to the Kyoto Protocol to achieve their Kyoto targets.
73 The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has
undertaken efforts in this direction. See H. Mann et al., IISD Model
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Develop-
ment (IISD, 2005). A more specific recommendation to address the
interactions between the CDM and investment agreements is made
by J. Werksman et al., n. 59 above, at 80–82, who recommend
addressing these through both the design of  the CDM, as well as
through negotiation of  additional, adjusted investment agreements.
74 For an extensive assessment on the material linkages between climate
change and ozone depletion, see J. Malabed et al., Inter-Linkages
Between the Ozone and Climate Change Conventions. Part I – Inter-
Linkages Between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols (United Nations
University, 2001); and United Nations Environment Programme,
Environmental Effects of  Ozone Depletion and its Interactions with
Climate Change: 2002 Assessment (UNEP Assessment Panel on
the Environmental Effects of  Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, 2001).
75 Draft Conclusions of  the Workshop on Linkages and Synergies of
Regional and Global Emission Control (Laxenburg, Austria, 27–
29 January 2003), available at <http://www.iiasa.ac.at/rains/meetings/
AP&GHG-Jan2003/conclusions.pdf>.
76 Convention for the Protection of  the Ozone Layer (Vienna,
22 March 1985).
77 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal,
16 September 1987).
78 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (Geneva,
13 November 1979).
79 Technically, sulphur dioxide emissions can have a temporary cooling
effect in the atmosphere. This can mask the warming effect of  climate
change. While some may argue that this is a negative linkage between
the two regimes, the position here is taken that sulphur emissions
cause acid rain and, hence, are a serious environmental problem. In any
event, the cooling effect is temporary. Hence, there is no real conflict
between the air pollution regime and climate change on this issue.
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different secretariats are observers in the negotiations
in each other’s regimes. Research cooperation between
the scientiﬁc bodies of the climate and ozone regimes
has also been initiated.80 There is potential for syner-
gies between the ﬁnancial mechanism of the Montreal
Protocol and the UNFCCC, but only if the goals of the
two treaties are explicitly synchronized.81 The UNFCCC
explicitly focuses on greenhouse gases not covered by
the Montreal Protocol;82 however, the Montreal Protocol
should ensure that it does not introduce ozone-depleting
substances that are greenhouse gases.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND OTHER 
ISSUE AREAS
Climate change also has links with a number of other
issue areas. These include health, international trans-
port, human settlements, freshwater, and the oceans
and seas.
Changes in weather and climate can both directly
affect human lives through heat and cold waves, but
also indirectly through the spread of disease-carrying
bacteria and viruses. Mainstreaming climate change
impacts and adapting them into the work of the World
Health Organization (WHO) may be one way to mini-
mize the adverse effects of climate change on health
and goes a step beyond current activities that include
reports from the WHO to the UNFCCC Subsidiary
Body for Scientiﬁc and Technological Advice.
The emissions given out by ships and aircrafts are
presently not attributed to countries and are regulated
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
and the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). Although cooperation with these organiza-
tions has been on the UNFCCC agenda for a long time,
little progress has been made.83 A common policy-
making forum between the three organizations could
enhance the effectiveness of policy making. Further-
more, threats of regulation of emissions from ships
and aircrafts, or unilateral action by individual
countries or the EU to reduce emissions, could
improve the situation.84
The UN Centre for Human Settlements (UN HABITAT)
promotes sustainable housing and urban governance.
There is considerable potential for linking the climate
change mitigation and adaptation agenda to the work
of this body, for example into HABITAT’s Disaster
Management Programme. This UN body could help
the UNFCCC explore options that could bypass central
governments and go directly to city governments to
address climate change issues.
Climate change is likely seriously to affect the hydro-
logical cycle and these changes, in turn, can affect the
climate. Although it is not yet in force, freshwater
issues will be primarily regulated by the 1997 UN
Watercourses Convention,85 as well as several regional
and bilateral agreements. Many of these regimes may
need to re-examine the issue of water allocation to
see how they can adopt more relevant responses to
the impact of climate change on freshwater. Similarly,
national governments may need to check whether they
have taken into account the impacts of climate change
on their water supply and hydropower facilities.
Oceans and seas are primarily governed by the 1982
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea86 and several
regional seas agreements. Possible cooperation with
these bodies could ensure that all the new options
being explored – such as deep-sea carbon storage –
are also taken into account.87
CONCLUSIONS
This analysis of ways of widening the climate change
regime by using issue linkages reveals a number of
potential ways to breathe new life into the process.
Some are already being explored by the secretariats of
various regimes; some still need to be further developed.
80 This cooperation led, in 2005, to a joint report by the scientific
bodies of  the climate (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
and ozone (Technology and Economic Assessment Panel) regimes:
IPCC and TEAP, Safeguarding the Ozone Layer and the Global
Climate System: Issues Related to Hydrofluorocarbons and Perfluoro-
carbons (Cambridge University Press, 2005). A summary is available
at <http://www.ipcc.ch/press/SPM.pdf>.
81 This means that coordinated efforts could be made to strengthen
financial support for substitutes for ozone-depleting substances that
do not exacerbate climate change. This would result in a triple dividend
for climate change mitigation, reduction of ozone-depleting substances
and cost effectiveness. See J. Malabed et al., n. 74 above, at 23.
82 See UNFCCC, n. 2 above, Article 4(1)(a).
83 See Kyoto Protocol, n. 3 above, Article 2(2), which requests the
ICAO and IMO to take up the issue of  greenhouse gas emissions by
international transport, but the organizations have not taken any
substantive action as yet.
84 S. Oberthür, ‘Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto
Protocol’, 3:3 Climate Policy (2003), at 202–203.
85 Convention on the Non-Navigable Uses of  International Water-
courses (New York, 21 May 1997). Although this convention has not
yet entered into force, ‘its status as the most authoritative statement
of  general principles and rules governing the non-navigational uses
of  international watercourses’ will likely contribute to its success.
See S. McCaffrey, ‘The Contribution of  the UN Convention on the
Law of  the Non-Navigational Uses of  International Watercourses’,
1:3/4 Int. J. Global Environmental Issues (2001), at 261.
86 United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (Montego Bay,
10 December 1982). See F. Biermann, ‘Land in Sight for Marine
Environmentalists? A Review of  the United Nations Convention on
the Law of  the Sea and the Washington Programme of  Action’, 76:1
Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplomatiques et Poli-
tiques (The International Law Review) (1998), 35.
87 See, in general, J. Heinrich, Legal Implications of  CO2 Ocean
Storage, Working Paper (Laboratory for Energy and the Environ-
ment, Massachusetts Institute of  Technology, July 2002).
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Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that
policies to widen the agenda can be classiﬁed into four
types of measures.
The ﬁrst type of measures includes those that are
needed to align activities in the climate regime with
activities in related regimes. This means that parties
to the UNFCCC may need to explore the option of
developing new MoUs with other UN agencies and
bodies. Such MoUs could be established with the GEF
(especially with respect to the implementation of
the different funding mechanisms), ICAO and IMO,
the development banks and the WTO. The politics and
economics of these bodies is so complicated that
only a high-level agreement may provide the political
momentum and the legal mandate to these bodies to
explore avenues for cooperation. Where the politics is
less charged, there might be room for cooperation at
the level of the bureaucracies, that is, the respective
secretariats of the existing conventions and organiza-
tions. While such cooperation is feasible, actually
merging these secretariats to enhance the efﬁciency of
the system will be hard to achieve, as there is ﬁerce
competition between host countries.88 With regard to
land use, a ﬁrst step would be inviting Ramsar to join
as a full member of the JLG between the UNCCD, CBD
and the UNFCCC. The development of a joint working
group and/or an international partnership on sustain-
able energy policy could also help to ensure that
conﬂicts with regard to energy issues are signalled
early and that possible synergies are explored.
The second type of measures includes those that can
be taken either within the climate regime or outside
as part of bilateral, multilateral, regional or sectoral
agreements. These include the development of pro-
tocols encouraging governments to adopt targets for
the development of renewable energy, on research and
development of energy technologies, and on trans-
national sectoral targets for highly internationalized
sectors to promote technological development.
Additionally, national workshops to integrate land-use
concerns relating to desertiﬁcation, deforestation and
development with climate change could form a useful
method to explore synergies at the national level.
The third type of measures includes those that could
be taken exclusively outside the climate regime. These
include mainstreaming climate change policy at the
international and national level, within the policies of
the FAO, UN HABITAT and the development banks,
as well as in foreign investment policy (in the form of
guidelines for foreign investors). Speciﬁc measures
include the need for negotiating a possible multilateral
sustainable investment agreement.
The fourth type concerns policy measures needed
exclusively within the climate regime in follow-up
agreements or as decisions of the UNFCCC COP.
These include the development of simple rules for
funding adaptation strategies in cooperation with the
aid agencies; improving the design of the Kyoto
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)89 to
pre-empt investment disputes; developing measures
within the CDM to ensure that it cannot be misused
through, inter alia, providing credits for previously
converted wetlands, promote zoning to protect fragile
ecosystems (that can also help to reduce vulnerability
of local communities), and developing and promoting
the concept of multi-functional land use. It might also
be appropriate to either amend the existing UNFCCC
or add a protocol to deal with other local pollutants,
which would also help reduce global warming. A pro-
tocol may also be developed to promote cooperation
between cities, building on experiences, for example,
of UN HABITAT.
These are only some of the possible measures. They
may help to buy time in a process where negotiations
are ﬂagging on an issue that is increasingly pressing.
Harro van Asselt LL.M. is a legal researcher at the
Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), Faculty of
Earth and Life Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam,
the Netherlands.
Professor Joyeeta Gupta is Professor of  Policy and
Law on Water Resources and the Environment at the
UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education in Delft, the
Netherlands, and Deputy Head of  the Department of
Environmental Policy Analysis at the Institute for
Environmental Studies, Faculty of  Earth and Life
Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Professor Frank Biermann is Head of  Department of
Environmental Policy Analysis at the Institute for
Environmental Studies (IVM), Faculty of  Earth and Life
Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
This article integrates results of  the research project
‘Options for Post-2012 Climate Policies and International
Agreements’, financed by the Dutch National Research
Programme on Global Change (NRP-GC). This article
has been partially written in the context of  the project on
inter-governmental and private environmental regimes
and compatibility with good governance, rule of  law and
sustainable development financed by the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research.
The authors wish to thank Heleen de Coninck, Marcel
Kok and Sebastian Oberthür for valuable comments on
an earlier draft of  this article.
88 See S. Oberthür, ‘Clustering of  Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments: Potentials and Limitations’, 2:4 International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2002), at 321–322. 89 See n. 60 above.
